

Ben-Alexander Bohnke: What is Integral Logic? (2017, April 19)

1) Definition

In my model, Integral Logic is an approach that

- on the one hand, the logic *extends*, especially with regard to quantification,
- on the other hand, the logic *unifies*, integrates different logics into a whole.

2) Object level

- There are mainly the following object areas (or interpretations) of the logic: *ontical* (eg facts), *linguistic* (eg sentences, propositions), *psychological* (eg judgments).
- From the point of view of the Integral logic, these distinctions are not relevant for the primary logic; one can go out neutrally or uniformly from *relations*. (Also, sentences with a 1-digit predicator correspond to deep-structural relations.) I therefore give a neutral statement as to whether a relation is occupied / valid (+) or not occupied / invalid (-), so also in the "truth tables". The linguistic *truth values* (true, false) I only use in special cases.

3) Objects versus relations

- It usually makes sense to distinguish between *objects* and *relations*. Only relations are occupied ("true") or not occupied ("wrong"), for objects one does not specify this.
- In a more general theory, you can also specify whether objects are occupied or not for objects. For example, "Socrates is occupied": the object Socrates exists (or the name "Socrates" has an extension). The same applies to "not occupied".

4) Relators

- The perhaps most important logical relation is the *copula*. This is represented by very different relators: in propositional logic the implicator $A \circledast B$, in predicate logic – without sign – Fx (x has the property F), in set-theory as element relation $x \hat{=} F$ or as a subset-relation $F \hat{=} G$.
- These different approaches can be standardized. The following is recommended:
 Either a functional, implicative representation $A \circledast B, x \circledast F, F \circledast G$
 Or a set-theoretic representation $A \hat{=} B, x \hat{=} F, F \hat{=} G$.

Functionally, for example, "Socrates is a philosopher" is interpreted as "If Socrates exists, the class of philosophers is not empty." (Also *intensional* is a functional as well as a set-relational interpretation possible, since one can grasp properties as union of partial properties.)

5) Synthetic and analytical

- Normally, only a distinction is made between synthetic relations (propositions) such as $X \circledast Y$ and analytic relations (propositions), tautological as well as $X \supset X$ or contradictory ones $X \dot{\cup} \emptyset X$. M. E., however, is to be extended to include partially analytic (or partially synthetic) relations such as $(X \dot{\cup} Y) \frac{3}{4} \circledast Y$.
- In principle one could define the difference between synthetic and (partial) analytic sentences quantitatively, not as here qualitatively, but this has not proved itself.

6) Propositional Logic and Predicate Logic

- From the point of view of the integral logic, the primary difference between propositional

logic and predicate logic lies in its *quantitative structure*. The propositional logic only distinguishes between two values: *position* (X), *negation* ($\emptyset X$). In contrast, the predicate logic differentiates four values: L , $L\emptyset$, V and $V\emptyset$.

- The propositional-logical $F \textcircled{R} G$ corresponds to the predicate-logical $Lx(Fx \textcircled{R} Gx)$, $F \textcircled{R} \emptyset G$ corresponds to $Lx(Fx \textcircled{R} \emptyset Gx)$ etc.

7) Quantitative structure of different logics

- The quantifier-logical distinction between "all" and "some" is found in other logics or linguistic opposites.

All, necessary, offered, must, always

Some, possible, lawful, may, sometimes

- Thus, a *modal logic* can be completely derived from the *predicate logic*, which in turn leads to a simplification. For example, "Fx_i is necessary" can usually be returned to $Lx(Fx)$, "Fx_i is possible" to $Vx(Fx)$. And, as $Lx(Fx) \supset Vx(Fx)$ holds, "Fx_i is necessary" \supset "Fx_i is possible".

8) Empirical Probability of Synthetic Relations

- Logical relations implicitly contain a quantitative (numerical) determination, namely the *empirical* (or statistical) probability p .

Thus, for the 2-valued propositional logic, the position has the value $p = 1$, the negation has the value $p = 0$. Hence $X \textcircled{R} Y$ stands for $p(X \textcircled{R} Y) = 1$, $\emptyset(X \textcircled{R} Y)$ stands for $p(X \textcircled{R} Y) = 0$.

- For the predicate logic (with quantifiers): L : $p = 1$, $L\emptyset$: $p = 0$, V : $p > 0$, $V\emptyset$: $p < 1$

9) General quantitative (synthetic) logic

- On the other hand, a general quantitative logic can also be conceived, by means of the empirical probability p . Where "a" is the *absolute frequency* $q(X \dot{\cup} Y)$ etc.

$a = q(X \dot{\cup} \emptyset Y)$, $b = q(X \dot{\cup} \emptyset Y)$, $c = q(\emptyset X \dot{\cup} Y)$, $d = q(\emptyset X \dot{\cup} \emptyset Y)$

Here, for the *implication* $p(X \textcircled{R} Y) = r/n$. Where $p(X \textcircled{R} Y) = \frac{a + c + d}{a + b + c + d}$

p is calculated by the number of real cases (r) in the possible worlds (n).

If $p = 1$ or $p = 0$, the relation is *deterministic*, if $0 < p < 1$ it is *statistical*.

- Thus the propositional logic is a borderline case of the predicate logic, the predicate logic is a borderline case of a general quantitative logic.

10) Theoretical probability

- The theoretical probability p^T indicates how likely a relation is according to the rules of combinatorics, that is, under random conditions. – The inverse of the theoretical probability $1 - p^T$ is the *information content* of a relation.

- The theoretical probability, however, also indicates the degree of tautology, that is, the degree of theoretical truth.

11) Theoretical probability of synthetic relations

- For synthetic relations: $0 < p^T < 1$. For example, $p^T[X \textcircled{R} Y] = 3/4$. However, it is also possible to calculate p^T for quantitative synthetic relations. E.g.

$$p^T[p(X \textcircled{R} Y) = r/n] = \sum_{\substack{\emptyset \\ \emptyset}}^{\emptyset \emptyset} \frac{3}{4}^r \left(\frac{1}{4}\right)^{n-r}$$

- Thus, a *tautology degree* is also given to synthetic relations.

12) Theoretical truth of analytic relations

- For analytical relations: tautological: $p^T = 1$, contradictory: $p^T = 0$.
- For semi-analytic relations: $0 < p^T < 1$. For example, $p^T[X \dot{\cup} Y \textcircled{R} Y] = 3/4$.

It is also possible to calculate p^T for quantitative semi-analytic relations. In 2 steps:

(Here I use the *positive implication* introduced by me, $* \textcircled{R}$ instead of the normal \textcircled{R} .)

1): $p(X \dot{\cup} Y) = r/n * \frac{3}{4} \textcircled{R} p(Y) \leq r/n$. If $p(X \dot{\cup} Y) > 0$, there are different solutions for $p(Y)$.

To calculate p^T for one of these solutions $p(Y) = s/n$, one proceeds as follows.

$$2): p(X \dot{\cup} Y) = r/n * \frac{3}{4} \textcircled{R} p(Y) = s/n \quad p^T = \frac{\frac{3}{4} \cdot \frac{s}{n}}{r/n} = \frac{3s}{4r} = \frac{3}{4} \left(\frac{1}{3}\right)^s \left(\frac{2}{3}\right)^{r-s}$$

Literature:

Ben-Alexander Bohnke: INTEGRALE LOGIK

Ein neues Modell philosophischer und mathematischer Logik

Selbstpublikation, 1. und 2. Aufl., Bad Neuenahr-Ahrweiler 2008

ISBN 978-3-00-023632-7

Ben-Alexander Bohnke: NEUE LOGIK

Einführung in die Integrale Logik

Selbstpublikation, Bad Neuenahr-Ahrweiler 2008

ISBN 978-3-00-024415-5

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